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Looking Beyond the Veil
IMMANUEL V. CHOCO*
ABSTRACT
From establishments of state religions to bans on headscarves,
religious minorities experience discrimination. In the post-September 11,
2001, world, Muslim women in particular have faced harsh forms of
discrimination and stereotyping; this stigma has only been worsened
with the recent influx of immigrants into Europe. With increasing
numbers of immigrants, some countries have attempted to assimilate
minority religious groups by banning the religious use of headscarves.
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., a case from the United States
Supreme Court, was a break for Muslim women. This case, which
involved a Muslim plaintiff, held that religious practices are to be given
favored treatment by employers in the workplace. This Note reads the
Abercrombie case against the background of the First Amendment's
Religion Clauses, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
globalization. Given the widespread discrimination that Muslim women
currently face across the globe, this Note considers what steps the
international community might take next to protect not only Muslim
women but also other religious minorities in the workplace.
INTRODUCTION
Who cares about religion nowadays, anyway? By many measures,
religion has occupied an unparalleled role in the development of society
and in the human experience. For thousands of years, religious beliefs
have shaped both laws and customs.' So, too, has religion influenced
* Executive Notes Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Volume 24; J.D.
2017, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington; B.A. 2014, The University
of Kansas-Lawrence. The author expresses his appreciation to his family, friends, and
professors for their feedback, insight, and continuous support, as well as to the members
of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies for their careful proofreading and editing.
The author takes the sole blame for any mental slips. "Praise be to God... ." Psalm 66:20.
1. See, e.g., Imam Khomeini, Islamic Government, in THE POLITICAL THEORY READER
255, 256 (Paul Schumaker ed., 2010) ("There is not a single topic in human life for which
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theories of morality and government; 2 how people group together is
often affected by their shared religious beliefs. 3 In 2012, at least eighty
percent of the world's population held a religious faith.4 And, according
to some research polls, the world will only become a more religious place
in future years.5 Surely religion's impact cannot be questioned.
Despite religion's presence in history and in contemporary life, some
people have begun to undermine its values and practices, especially
when the tenets of any one religion conflicts with their own personal
viewpoints. Challenges to differing religious beliefs are now seemingly
all too common, no matter where one looks. For example, because of its
strong stance on secularism and its state policy that minority
"assimilation [should be] a condition of membership,"6 France bans
Muslim women from wearing religious scarves and garments in public.7
In December 2016, Germany's Chancellor, Angela Merkel, indicated
that her country might follow suit when she stated that full veils should
be prohibited "wherever it is legally possible."8
But religious conflicts take a more extreme form in other places. In
Sudan, for example, instances have been reported of extremist groups
Islam has not provided instruction and established a norm."); Exodus 20:1-21 (listing the
Ten Commandments).
2. See, e.g., BARBARA MACKINNON, ETHICS: THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 3
(7th ed. 2012) ("Many people get their ethical or moral views from their religion.... Some
religions recognize and revere saints or holy people who provide models for us and
exemplify virtues we should emulate."); John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in
THE POLITICAL THEORY READER, supra note 1, at 259, 260 (Paul Schumaker ed., 2010)
(writing that government cannot force anyone to adhere to a religion).
3. See RICHARD K. FENN, THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
233 (2003) ("[There is undeniable evidence of ... strength in the attachment to collective
religious identities in some places.").
4. Jennifer Harper, 84 Percent of the World Population Has Faith; A Third Are
Christian, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2012, 11:05 AM), http/www.washingtontimes.com/blog/wate
rcooler/201dec/2/84-percent-world-population-as-faith-third-ae-ch/.
5. See Will Worley, What Are the Largest Religious Groups Around the World, and
Where Are They? The Distribution of Religions Across the World, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 13,
2016), http://www.independentco.uk/newsworld/what-are-the-largest-religious-groups-around-the-
world-and-where-are-they-a6982706.htmL
6. Laura Barnett, Freedom of Religion and Religious Symbols in the Public Sphere, in
GLOBAL ISSUES IN FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RELIGION 119, 120 (2009). Here, membership
is meant as the equivalent of citizenship.
7. Peter Allen, France's Senate Backs National Assembly and Bans Women from
Wearing the Burka in Public, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 15, 2010), httpJ/www.dailymailco.uk/news/ar
ticle-1312016/Frances-Senate-bans-women-wearing-burka-public.html
8. The Islamic Veil Across Europe, BBC (Jan. 31, 2017), http1/www.bbc.om/news/world-
europe-13038095.
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burning down Christian churches.9 And, as this Note is being written,
approximately eleven million people have fled their homes because of
the Syrian civil war,10 which is, in part, a religious struggle."
Sometimes, conflicts between religion and social interests can operate in
much grayer areas. Such is the case in the United States, where some
people, such as bakers and small business owners, claim that the
government cannot force them to serve homosexual customers, lest their
religious beliefs be violated.12 All of these examples are occurring more
frequently. Still, the "scale of religious persecution around the world is
not widely appreciated." 13 Why this is so, is somewhat of a mystery.
It is mysterious precisely because any tolerance of religious
discrimination or lack of respect for another's religious beliefs, absent
legitimate and compelling state interests, is antithetical to a liberal
tradition that has long regarded freedom of religion as the oldest
internationally recognized human right.14 Many of the most careful and
insightful writers on religion have opined that all other rights are
fundamentally linked with religious liberty.15 The importance of
religious liberty is apparent in many constitutions. The French
Constitution, for example, guarantees its citizens equality before the
law, regardless of religion.' 6 The German Constitution likewise protects
9. See, e.g., 'Religious Discrimination in Sudan Creates Space for Extremism' SDFG,
DABANGA (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.dabangasudan.org/enlall-news/article/religious-
discrimination-in-sudan-creates-space-for-extremism-sdfg.
10. See A Snapshot of the Crisis-In the Middle East and Europe, SYRIAN REFUGEES
(last updated Sept. 2016), http://syrianrefugees.eu.
11. See Daniel Burke, Syria Explained: How it Became a Religious War, CNN BELIEF
BLOG (Sept. 4, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://rehgion.blogs.cnn.com/2013/09/04/syrian-wars-got-
religion-and-that-aint-good/ (stating that the civil war in Syria is being drawn along
religious lines).
12. See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015) (suit
brought against a baker after his refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex
wedding); State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 720213 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015) (suit brought against a small business owner after she refused to
arrange flowers for a same-sex wedding).
13. Charles, The Prince of Wales, Thought for the Day (Dec. 22, 2016), http//www.bbc.co
m/news/uk-38402277.
14. See John P. Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 171, 176 (Theodor Meron ed., 1986).
15. See, e.g., Natan Lerner, Religious Human Rights Under the United Nations, in
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 79, 83 (Johan
D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996); ELLIS M. WEST, THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: GUARANTEES OF STATES' RIGHTS? 1 (2011); Irving Bryant,
Madison: On the Separation of Church and State, 8 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 3 (1951)
("[F]reedom of religion was the fundamental item upon which all other forms of civil
liberty depended. Its maintenance would not automatically preserve the entire liberty of
the citizen. But without it the other rights were sure to be destroyed.").
16. 1958 CONST. I (Fr.).
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the freedom of conscience and the "undisturbed practice of religion."17
And the United States Constitution adds another facet by barring
government from establishing a state religion.18 What is a mystery is if
the religious guarantees from these constitutions are hollow or whether
they only apply fully to certain groups of people. As illustrated by the
previous examples from France, Germany, and Sudan, tolerance is
slowly disappearing. In the United States, although they may not
experience legally sanctioned discrimination, bakers and other small
business owners can still face social opprobrium if they follow beliefs
contrary to the majority opinion; in the United States, then, respect is
waning. Perhaps in this light, the important question is not whether
anyone cares about religion in itself-because people and governments
clearly do-but whether anyone still cares about the values of religious
toleration.
Enter the Supreme Court of the United States in June 2015, when
Justice Antonin Scalia summarized the Court's main points in his
opinion for EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,19 an employment
discrimination case that was overshadowed by the likes of King v.
Burwell20 and Obergefell v. Hodges.21 Abercrombie involved a practicing
Muslim, Samantha Elauf, who applied for a position at an Abercrombie
outlet in Tulsa, Oklahoma.22 Because of her religion, Elauf wore a black
scarf over her head, commonly known as an Islamic hijab.23 The district
store manager declined to hire Elauf pursuant to Abercrombie's apparel
policy, reasoning that all "headwear, religious or otherwise," 24 would
violate it, and Elauf subsequently brought suit against the store. In
17. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. IV, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de.englischgg/index.html.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
20. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (ruling on the constitutionality of part of the Affordable Care
Act).
21. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (ruling on the constitutionality of same-sex marriages).
Arguably, Abercrombie had every tool to become a high-profile case, as it included issues
of Islam, stereotyping, and gender equality. See infra note 25.
22. Adam Liptak, Justices Rule Against Retailer in Clash over Applicant's Head Scarf,
N.Y. TiMES, June 2, 2015, at A8.
23. Hijab is not to be confused with the Islamic burka, an article of clothing that
typically covers the entire body. See, e.g., Peter Cumper & Tom Lewis, 'Taking Religion
Seriously'? Human Rights and Hijab in Europe-Some Problems of Adjudication, 24 J.L.
& RELIGION 599, 602 (2009) (explaining how and why different types of Islamic clothing
generate controversy).
24. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2031.
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Justice Scalia's words at the announcement hearing, this was a "really
easy"25 case to determine.
The Court sided with Elauf on a vote of 8 to 1. The problem, as the
Court identified it, was that Elaufs religious practice became a
motivating factor in the manager's decision not to hire her. 26 Even if an
employer adopts a policy that is facially neutral, the Court wrote, the
employer must still accommodate an applicant's religious exercise, so
long as the accommodation is reasonable.27 Further still, the majority
opinion stated outright that, at least in the context of employment
discrimination cases, religious practices should be given "favored
treatment"28 by employers. And it is certainly possible to read the
Abercrombie decision to mean that, as a general matter, religious beliefs
are a characteristic that judges should keep a keen eye out for in
discrimination cases.
Now, the result of Abercrombie can perhaps be interpreted in two
strands: a domestic strand and a global strand. In the domestic strand,
the outcome in Abercrombie is, in some measures, unsurprising when
understood in light of legal developments from the Supreme Court. Over
the past six or seven decades, the Supreme Court has taken an
extraordinarily solicitous stance on religious freedom-and this fact
certainly helped Elauf win her argument. The case, however, can also be
read in the context of modern globalization. Religion and globalization
are intertwined. This, too, is unsurprising, as some religions, such as
Christianity and Islam, are inherently global because adherents are
called to establish a global network of believers to the faiths. 29
Moreover, similar cases to Elaufs have been brought in European
countries, but with opposite results. Because globalization offers a
vehicle by which political, legal, social, and religious changes can occur
across international borders, one can only speculate what role
Abercrombie might play when the next religious dress case comes up in
Europe or, indeed, anywhere in the world. Because of globalization,
what occurs in one region will eventually impact the ongoing
developments in another. Putting it another way, the spread and
expansion of religious freedom is akin to a dialogue, a conversation
25. Walter Olson, A Hijab and a Hunch- Abercrombie and the Limits of Religious
Accommodation, 2014-15 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 139 (2015).
26. See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033 ("[T]he rule for disparate-treatment claims
based on a failure to accommodate a religious practice is straightforward: An employer
may not make an applicant's religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in
employment decisions.").
27. Id. at 2032-34; see also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j) (42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e()).
28. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2034.
29. Introduction, Religion and Globalization, 4 HEDGEHOG REV., Summer 2002, at 5.
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between vastly different societies striving to coexist. Therefore, one may
very well also inquire whether Abercrombie can be a catalyst for greater
religious freedom in workplaces across a world filled with diverse
beliefs, cultures, and norms. This Note is structured around these two
strands.
Part I of this Note focuses on the meaning and development of
religious liberty in the domestic context. Part I, on the whole, gives only
a minuscule account of this evolution, but it still gives enough
background for one to adequately understand the Supreme Court's
Abercrombie decision from a doctrinal standpoint. In so doing, it strives
to illustrate how globalization affected the Framers' early, basic
understanding of religious freedom; the Framers, in short, were
borrowers and blenders of different European thought, especially when
it came to philosophical theories that sought to delineate the contours
between governmental power and individual belief. Consequently, some
detail will be given as to how European Enlightenment thought
influenced the American conception of religious liberty.
Part II gives Abercrombie its share of fair treatment, giving a deeper
look at the religious role of headscarves in Islam as well as the case's
journey through the courts. Part II also surveys aspects of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the legal framework through which
employment discrimination plaintiffs like Elauf often bring their claims.
It then examines the Abercrombie case in light of the legal history and
developments described throughout Part I.
Part III examines what the Abercrombie case might potentially
mean in the context of modern globalization. Part III explores whether
the conception of religious accommodation in Title VII can be
incorporated into a theory of international human rights law. In
particular, Part III considers the theories of jus cogens and
international customary law to determine whether either can allow for
greater religious liberty and expression across the world.
I. RELIGIOUS VALUES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE
UNITED STATES
One central feature of the United States' system of government is its
commitment to religious liberty, or freedom of thought. Free exercise
has sometimes been coined as the "first freedom,"30 and its placement in
30. See generally GREGG IVERS, REDEFINING THE FIRST FREEDOM: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF STATE POWER (1993) (examining the church-state relationship
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court); WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION
AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1986) (describing the origins of the concept of religious
liberty).
552
LOOKING BEYOND THE VEIL
the First Amendment alone speaks volumes as to the importance that
the Framers associated with religion; religious freedom was the spring
by which other rights, most notably freedom of expression, 31 could
flourish. No wonder the Framers anchored the freedom of religion as a
basis of American society.
Many of the Framers, such as Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and
James Madison, were deeply influenced by their contemporary figures
in the European Enlightenment, such as John Calvin, John Locke, and
Montesquieu. 32 Paine, for example, applauded the 1789 French
revolutionaries for their establishment of the universal right of
conscience. 33 Similarly, Jefferson's political views were informed by the
Scottish philosophers Francis Hutcheson and Lord Kames. 34 And
Madison, although reportedly the most irreligious of the three,35
espoused the Lockean view that the "purity of both government and
institutional religion"36 will foster free exercise and religious practice.
This borrowing of ideas has led at least one author to write that the
"Americans of the eighteenth century were blenders . . . ."37 Therefore,
at the very least, globalization, through the spread of ideas, influenced
Americans' early ideas of what religious liberty should entail.
Domestically, religious liberty in the United States begins at the
state level. Local movements toward a separation of church and state
began well before the adoption of the federal constitution in 1789.
Religion's importance in civil society, as well as its dangerous union
with government, was already realized by the Framers, especially by
Madison, the intellectual architect behind the Bill of Rights. In 1774, for
instance, in a letter to a colleague, Madison wrote that slavery would
surely have been institutionalized in the New England region had the
Church of England been established there.38 At the time, six stateS39
31. Similarly, the juxtaposition of the Free Speech and Religion Clauses in the First
Amendment indicate their close relationship. Prayer, for example, is every much a form of
expression as it is a religious practice.
32. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1479 (18th
ed. 2013); Arlin M. Adam & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1559, 1605 (1989).
33. See Adam & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1584.
34. See MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, LAUNCHING LIBERALISM: ON LOCKEAN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 205 (2002).
35. See Adam & Emmerich, supra note 32 at 1584.
36. Id. at 1586. But cf. GEORGE MACE, LOCKE, HOBBES, AND THE FEDERALIST PAPERS:
AN ESSAY ON THE GENESIS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL HERITAGE 140 (1979) (arguing
that, even if the Founding Fathers had been influenced by Locke and Montesquieu during
the American Revolution, Thomas Hobbes's political philosophy became the most
impactful by the time of the Constitution's drafting).
37. ZUCKERT, supra note 34, at 19.
38. See Bryant, supra note 15, at 3.
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had established churches and imposed taxes on all citizens, including
members of minority religious sects, to support, build, and maintain the
state-sponsored church property and services. It was this establishment
of state churches and state religion that caused religious dissenters'
arousal.40
In particular, it was Madison and Jefferson who spearheaded the
efforts to formulate a legal, constitutional provision for religious liberty.
Circumstances in Virginia provided them the perfect opportunity to
make their move. In 1784, Patrick Henry proposed an annual tax that
would support Christianity as Virginia's official religion; this was in
reaction to the Virginia Assembly depriving ministers of tax benefits
just a few years earlier. 41 Although Henry's Assessment Bill gained
traction from Anglicans, it also drew sharp criticism from Baptists and
Presbyterians. In response, Jefferson drafted a bill for religious freedom.
He began this bill by writing that "God hath created the mind free"42
and "that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishment or
burthens ... tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and
are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion . . . ."43
Textually, it is worth noting that Jefferson's bill incorporates Locke's
view that religion thrives best when it is freed from either the
constraints or the assistance of government. In sum, Jefferson focused
primarily on protecting the independence of the human mind as well as
the purity of religion. Henry's proposal was anathema to those ends.
For his part, Madison combatted Henry's Assessment Bill by writing
the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments."
Madison's preamble branded the Assessment Bill as "a dangerous abuse
of power." 45 The following paragraph set forth, as a first principle, every
man's "unalienable right"46 to the liberty of conscience. Madison argued
that any establishment of religion, no matter its degree, was an
abridgment of the right to freedom of conscience. Because liberty of
conscience was a duty "precedent, both in order of time and in degree of
39. See, e.g., DANIEL 0. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TIE RELIGION CLAUSES 19 (2d
ed. 2009) ("The Virginia understanding was far from universal. Seven states, including
Virginia, had adopted a policy of disestablishment. The remaining six states, however,
continued to maintain or authorize established religions.").
40. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947).
41. See Bryant, supra note 15, at 7-8.
42. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 32, at 1480.
43. Id.
44. See Adam & Emmerich, supra note 32, at 1574.
45. Id. (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 299 (William T. Hutchinson &
William M.E. Rachal eds. 1973)).
46. Id.
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obligation," 47 he further asserted that religious belief was an area
wholly exempt from government regulation. In Madison's view, then,
liberty of conscience was a foundational right, as all other rights would
collapse without it. Eventually, in the summer of 1785, the Memorial
and Remonstrance was widely distributed by Madison's contemporaries,
before the Virginia Assembly could vote on Henry's proposed bill.48 In
effect, the Memorial and Remonstrance generated so much political
backing from Christian minority denominations that Henry's
Assessment Bill was killed later that December, and, in 1786, the
Virginia Assembly adopted Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom instead. 49
Between 1786 and 1791, after the United States Constitution had
already been ratified, other states likewise passed their own laws
safeguarding the liberty of conscience.50 Whereas Madison believed that
no bill of rights was needed at the federal level,5 ' the same religious
minorities that had opposed the taxes in Virginia now protested the
absence of a similar guarantee for the freedom of conscience in the
Constitution.52 Political pressure from opponents, 53 as well as the
prospect of yet another convention "for a reconsideration of the whole
structure of the Constitution,"54 forced Madison to shift from his initial
position to become an advocate for a bill of rights, albeit a reluctant
one.5 5 Perhaps this was so because Madison had to be so cautious in his
craftsmanship, as religious policies across the states were still diverse.56
After several drafts and reassurances to some statesmen that the
clauses would apply only against the national government and would
47. Id. (quoting Madison, supra note 46, at 299).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. SULLIvAN & FELDMAN, supra note 32, at 1480.
51. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 3 (James Madison) ("[S]ociety itself will be broken
into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of
the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a
free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights.
It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the
multiplicity of sects.") (emphasis added); Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of
Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 310 (1990) ("Federalists argued
that a bill of rights would be useless in stopping the government from trampling on the
liberties of the people. Many members of the Convention, including Madison, believed that
paper guarantees of basic rights meant very little.").
52. SULLIvAN & FELDMAN, supra note 33, at 1480.
53. Id.
54. Finkelman, supra note 51, at 337.
55. See id. at 336-44.
56. See, e.g., CONKLE, supra note 39, at 19.
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leave current state policies intact,57 Congress ratified the Bill of Rights.
The final text is familiar language: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . ...58 Similar to the French revolutionaries, Madison
guaranteed constitutional protection for the freedom of conscience
through the Free Exercise Clause. But he went further. By including
the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights, Madison created "both a
floor and a ceiling over the formulation of religion policy by the states."59
Of course, the exact meanings of the Religion Clauses have been the
subject of much debate and dispute, even though the Free Exercise
Clause was the first guarantee of the First Amendment that the
Supreme Court substantively analyzed.6 0 In 1878, in Reynolds v. United
States,6 1 the Supreme Court originally interpreted the clause to actually
allow for governmental interference with religious practices. But the
meaning of free exercise would change by the time Congress enacted
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,62 which makes it illegal for an
employer to make a hiring decision on account of an applicant's "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ."63
By the 1960s, the Supreme Court had interpreted free exercise to
require, at a minimum, that a person does not have "to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
accept work, on the other hand."64 In other words, the Supreme Court in
the latter half of the twentieth century had a much different
understanding of free exercise than the 1878 Court, and it also had a
57. See, e.g., SuLLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 32, at 1480-81.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19, 22
(2006).
60. See Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5,
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1571 (1995).
61. 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
62. Although the Religion Clauses should oftentimes be read together, this Note will
not focus on the Establishment Clause, as it is largely the Free Exercise Clause that
comes into dispute in employment discrimination cases.
63. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). Title
VII, however, did not always require accommodation of religious beliefs in the workplace.
It was not until Congress amended Title VII in 1972 that the statute required employers
to reasonably accommodate their employees' religious practices. See J. Gregory Grisham &
Robbin W. Hutton, Religious Accommodation in the Workplace: Current Trends Under
Title Vll, 15 ENGAGE, July 2014, at 60, 60 (2014).
64. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (ruling that South Carolina's
withholding of state unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist, who was fired
and could not find any comparable employment because she would not take Saturday
work, violated the Free Exercise Clause).
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much more solicitous view for religious practices. Beginning with Chief
Justice William Rehnquist's Court more specifically, Justices have
begun reviewing laws under the Free Exercise and Establishment
clauses in a more conservative fashion, in that the Court "tend[s] to
support laws that accommodate religious belief in various ways."65
Conversely, whenever the Rehnquist Court happened to strike down
ordinances affecting religion, it usually did so only when the regulation
at issue required more separation between church and state.6 6
One explanation for this significant doctrinal shift among different
Supreme Courts is the increasing variety of minority religious practices
that the United States harbors; arguably, globalization is also playing a
role here. In employment discrimination claims, for which purpose Title
VII was equipped to deal, more often than not, the plaintiff will come
from a minority group.6 7 In the same vein, many First Amendment
plaintiffs adhere to minority religious beliefs." The meanings of religion
and religious liberty, central to both documents, were simply updated by
the Supreme Court to accommodate more people and more differing
beliefs. Some have suggested that a broad reading of the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses necessitates a broad reading of Title
VII's provisions combatting religious discrimination in the workplace. 69
Although both the First Amendment's Religion Clauses and Title
VII protect essentially the same substantive values-the freedom of
people to make religious decisions for themselves, independent of
government coercion or influence-it is important to note that the two
protect people from different entities. The First Amendment protects
people from infringements by the federal 70 and state71 governments. On
the other hand, Title VII protects people from private sector employers.
Consequently, there are important differences in how the two are
65. CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS & JOHN C. BLAKEMAN, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND NEW
FEDERALISM: FROM THE REHNQUIST TO THE ROBERTS COURT 140, 141 (2012) (also
observing that the "larger universe of data shows the Rehnquist Court was more solicitous
of state and local religious policymaking than were the [other Courts]").
66. See id. at 140-41.
67. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (suit brought
by a member of the Worldwide Church of God); Crider v. Univ. of Tennessee at Knoxville,
492 F. App'x 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (suit brought by a Seventh-Day Adventist).
68. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(suit brought by devotees of the Santeria religion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(suit brought by a member of the Old Order Amish).
69. See generally JOSHUA D. DUNLAP, When Big Brother Plays God: The Religion
Clauses, Title VZ!, and the Ministerial Exception, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005 (arguing
that the First Amendments ministerial exception should likewise be read into Title VII's
provisions).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law. . . .") (emphasis added).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
557
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 24:2
applied to cases involving religious discrimination. In the First
Amendment context, courts apply a strict scrutiny standard whenever
they confront a law that outright regulates religious practice or
conduct.72 If a law is neutral toward religion, then courts might apply 73
the analysis set out in Employment Division v. Smith,74 which held that
the First Amendment forbids neutral laws of general applicability if
they affect not only free exercise but also other constitutional
protections.
In Title VII cases, by contrast, employers need to show that they
either tried reasonably accommodating an employee's religious practice
or that they could not do so without incurring an undue burden;75 both
standards are lower than the First Amendment's requirements. This,
then, is the legal framework in which the Abercrombie case would
operate. Nevertheless, although First Amendment standards did not
apply to Elaufs case and do not apply to employment discrimination
cases generally, studying the meaning and development of religious
liberty in the First Amendment context sheds light on the values that
Title VII and other laws, such as religious freedom restoration acts, seek
to protect.76
II. ABERCROMBIE: THROUGH THE LENS OF ISLAm AND DOCTRINE
To have a deeper, more meaningful understanding of Abercrombie's
impact and what it means for Muslim women, it is important to be
familiar with the role that Islamic hijab plays in the religious and social
spheres. Part II seeks to clarify the function of hijab in the Islamic faith
and to comprehend the Abercrombie decision in some detailed fashion-
in light of both the hijab's significance as well as legal doctrine.
A. The Religious and Social Significance of Islamic Hijab
For some time now, Islamic hijab-and, indeed, Islam as a
religion-has been misunderstood by people in the United States and
72. See CONKLE, supra note 39, at 96.
73. As Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006),
however, showed, courts will apply the standards set out in the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act if a neutral federal law is being challenged.
74. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
75. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015).
76. Further, the First Amendment was created long before Title VII; it is entirely
reasonable to think that at least some of the First Amendment's religious values were
incorporated into Title VIIs protections.
558
LOOKING BEYOND TiE VEIL
Europe,7 7 but perhaps more so in the post-September 11, 2001, world.7 8
Outside of the Middle East, Muslim women are often conveyed as
oppressed and as being forced to practice Islam by wearing hijab.79 This
conception, however, is mistaken, and has led to various restrictions on
Islamic dress in the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy,
Switzerland, Egypt, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and other countries. 80 This
misinterpretation has also carried social costs for Muslim women.
Between 2001 and 2002, for instance, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reported a threefold increase in the
number of complaints that involved Islamic garments like hijab.8 ' But
as one author writes, "Contrary to the stereotype, the Qur'an itself
prohibits forcing one to accept or practice Islam . . . ."82 Presumptively,
practice includes the wearing of hijab; just as the Qur'an does not
compel the practice of Islam, it also does not coerce anyone to wear
hijab.
Hijab derives from the Arabic word hajaba, which, in English,
literally translates into "to prevent from seeing."8 3 Far from being just a
mere article of clothing, hijab has religious significance, in that it is
"also hijab of the heart and intention. It is a choice to be modest, both in
character and appearance, not just physical modesty, but also in one's
thoughts, speech, and actions." 84 Thus, wearing hijab also entails the
modesty of one's privacy and morality, which is encouraged by the
Qur'an. In contrast to the popular viewpoint that the Qur'an requires
only women to be modest in clothing, the Qur'an "prescribes for both
Muslim men and women to be modest, in both character and dress."8 5
For Muslim women, veiling oneself in hijab qualifies as a "sincere and
meaningful [belief occupying] a place in the life of its possessor,"8 6
77. See, e.g., Najla Al Awadhi, The Hijab Is a Widely Misunderstood Symbol, GULF
NEWS (July 21, 2007, 11:16 PM), http1/gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/the-hijab-is-a-widely-
misunderstood-symbol-1.50203 (detailing some of the common misconceptions about the
religious headscarf).
78. See, e.g., Aliah Abdo, The Legal Status of Hijab in the United States: A Look at the
Sociopolitical Influences on the Legal Right to Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 5 HASTINGS
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 441, 441 (2008).
79. Id. at 447-48.
80. Alice Foster, Where in the World Are the Burka and Niqab Banned?, EXPRESS (Dec.
7, 2016, 9:09 AM), http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/652842/Burka-Niqab-Islamic-
Face-veil-Ban-UK-Fine-France-Belgium-Netherlands-Europe-Muslim-dress.
81. Kristina Benson, The Freedom to Believe and the Freedom to Practice: Title VII,
Muslim Women, and Hijab, 13 UCLA J. IsLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 1, 2 (2014).
82. Abdo, supra note 78, at 448.
83. Benson, supra note 81, at 2 n.3.
84. Abdo, supra note 78, at 449 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 448.
86. Grisham & Hutton, supra note 63, at 62.
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equivalent to religion itself. Therefore, there are many religious
justifications for veiling.
Islamic hijab is, moreover, a lifestyle. In practical terms, some
women have described veiling as a liberation because it frees them
"from societal expectations and judgments over a woman's body and
other physical characteristics." 87 Furthermore, wearing hijab allows
women to avoid the influences of the fashion industry8 8 as well as the
negative effects of sexuality.89 And, for Muslim immigrants, wearing
hijab identifies oneself with the Islamic faith; it is a way to distinguish
oneself from the majority. In other words, hijab is part of a collective
identity that is unique to Muslims. Hijab "sends a message that [a
woman .s] a Muslim, has respect for herself, and expects to be treated
respectfully, especially by the opposite sex."so As a lifestyle, Muslim
women choose to wear hijab; in their view, no law can legitimately
prohibit them from practicing their faith. Where and when one veils and
unveils, stems from personal, independent choice, and this basic
principle extends to places like the workplace. In this light, it is
apparent why a decision like Abercrombie would have special
significance to Muslim women-not just for those in the United States,
but for Muslim women around the world.
B. Understanding Abercrombie through the Title VII Framework
Although the Supreme Court decided the case in 2015, the factual
background to Abercrombie occurred in 2008, when Elauf, then
seventeen years old, filled out an application for a sales associate
position at Abercrombie Kids, a subsidiary of Abercrombie & Fitch.9 '
Like any designer store, Abercrombie is passionate about the
presentation of both its sales items and its employees. 92 Because of a
store policy that "exemplifies a classic East Coast collegiate style of
clothing," 93 Abercrombie employees are normally forbidden from
wearing caps, necklaces, and bracelets. 94
Elauf, like many teenagers, was familiar with the type of clothes
that the Abercrombie & Fitch brand promoted, and she realized that she
87. Abdo, supra note 78, at 449.
88. Id. at 450.
89. Sadia Aslam, Note, Hijab in the Workplace: Why Title VII Does Not Adequately
Protect Employees from Discrimination on the Basis of Religious Dress and Appearance, 80
UMKC L. REV. 221, 224 (2011).
90. Abdo, supra note 78, at 449.
91. Grisham & Hutton, supra note 63, at 64.
92. Olson, supra note 25, at 141.
93. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 2013).
94. Olson, supra note 25, at 141.
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would have to conform with the store's dress policy if she were to
become a sales associate.95 Before Elauf s interview with the local hiring
manager, an acquaintance at the store told Elauf that he thought her
hijab would be fine, but suggested that she wear a color other than
black." Nevertheless, at the interview, Elauf wore jeans, a T-shirt, and
a black hijab.9 7 Although Elauf never revealed her faith during the
interview,9 8 the interviewer assumed that she wore the scarf as a form
of religious practice." After she was declined the position, Elauf learned
from another Abercrombie employee that she was not hired because of
her hijab, 100 and, in 2009, the EEOC filed suit on her behalf.101
Prior to Elaufs case in the Tenth Circuit, courts had interpreted
Title VII to require an employment discrimination plaintiff to show that
the plaintiff held a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with the
employer's requirements or with the plaintiffs employment
responsibilities, that the plaintiff gave actual notice to the employer of
the conflict, and that the employer refused to hire the plaintiff for
failing to conform with the employer's rules. 102 Once a plaintiff made a
prima facie case of discrimination, employers could defend themselves
on the ground that they could not reasonably accommodate the
plaintiffs religion without incurring an undue hardship on the
business.103 With respect to the notice requirement for a plaintiffs
prima facie case, practitioners have noted that:
The notice component appears to have become a focal
point for courts, where the existence of a religious
conflict with the employer's workplace policies or job
duties arises and an adverse employment action is
taken. Courts appear willing to infer notice if an
employee makes reference to religion or religious belief
in workplace discussions with the employer over job
requirements or employer policies. Another trend
arguably present in more recent religious
accommodation cases is the subtle redefining of the de
minimis standard to place a more onerous burden on the
95. Grisham & Hutton, supra note 63, at 64-65.
96. Olson, supra note 25, at 141.
97. Id.; Grisham & Hutton, supra note 64, at 65.
98. Olson, supra note 25, at 141-42. In fact, neither Elaufs headscarf nor her religion
were brought up during the interview. Id.
99. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015).
100. Olson, supra note 25, at 142.
101. Id.
102. Grisham & Hutton, supra note 63, at 65.
103. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2032.
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employer to justify undue hardship than that originally
contemplated [earlier].104
Intuitively, the requirement that the employer have notice makes
good sense. If an employer did not really know about an applicant's
religious belief, then one is left to ponder how the employer could have
made an adverse decision on account of the applicant's religion.
Therefore, a plaintiff has some burden to bear, but that burden is not a
very high one. Following this framework, the 10th Circuit ruled for
Abercrombie and held that Elauf did not even meet her light burden of
proving notice, pointing out that Elauf never actually informed her
interviewer of the conflict between the store's dress policy and her hijab.
In regard to doctrine, the Supreme Court's reversal of the Tenth
Circuit's opinion is both surprising and unsurprising. It is surprising in
that the Court, as a whole, paid little attention to the notice
requirement in the Title VII framework. Throughout the three opinions
in the case, the word "notice" appears only once-in Justice Samuel
Alito's concurrence. 0 5 In fact, Justice Scalia's majority opinion even
went so far as to state that Title VII, unlike other antidiscrimination
statutes, imposes no knowledge requirement on an employer. o0 Instead,
in disparate treatment cases such as Elaufs, Title VII prohibits
employers from acting on bad motives. 07 Applying that principle to the
facts of the case, Abercrombie violated Title VII because the manager,
although she did not actually know that Elauf was a practicing Muslim,
still suspected that Elauf was Muslim.
On the other hand, Justice Scalia's opinion is unsurprising in light
of the expansive and solicitous view of religious liberty that the Court
has espoused over the past several decades. Moreover, this case involved
a plaintiff from a religious minority group and, as was explained
previously, the Court has changed its view of what religious liberty
means to the benefit of religious minorities. Viewed from this vantage
point, it is likely that the Court's evolving view of religion in the First
Amendment affected how the Court applied Title VII's framework.
Justice Clarence Thomas dissented in part, but suggested that he
might have sided with Elauf had she presented her case on a different
theory of employment discrimination. 0 8 Therefore, although he was in
104. Grisham & Hutton, supra note 63, at 67.
105. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2035 (Alto, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 2032.
107. Id. at 2033.
108. See id. at 2038 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, the effects of Abercrombie's
neutral Look Policy, absent an accommodation, fall more harshly on those who wear
headscarves as an aspect of their faith. But that is a classic case of an alleged disparate
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partial dissent, Justice Thomas showed a willingness to have
Abercrombie accommodate Elaufs hijab, given the right legal
arguments. Still, Justice Thomas's opinion makes a political statement,
as it implicitly acknowledges the role that religion plays in the
workforce and in society-a trait increasingly common among Supreme
Court Justices. At the very least, all nine of the Justices suggested
throughout the Court's Abercrombie decision that Title VII doctrine is
now in an age of solicitous religious accommodation.
III. DISCRIM[NATION AGAINST ISLAMIC HIJAB ON A GLOBAL SCALE: Do
INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES PROTECT RELIGIOus EQUALITY IN THE
WORKPLACE?
Although this Note has so far focused on the Abercrombie decision:
as mostly a domestic case, its factual background is more complete
when viewed as part of a current, global conversation surrounding the
stereotypes of Islam and its followers. Aggressions toward Muslim
women are not unique to the United States. Discrimination toward
religious minority groups such as Muslims occurs on a global scale, and
one author writes that anti-Muslim sentiment ranges from "China to
Congo-Brazzaville." 09 As Europe's second largest religious group, 110
Muslims, especially Muslim women, experience disparaging
discrimination in many European countries. This Note has already
mentioned the French headscarf ban and the proposed German ban as
examples. In the United Kingdom, the rate of unemployment for
Muslim women is three times higher than the national average."' On
the whole, most employment discrimination cases filed by Muslim
women involve Islamic attire.1 12
Arguably, globalization has had both positive and negative effects
on religion. On the one hand, religious groups and organizations have
been able to take advantage of transcultural "resources to mobilize
impact. It is not what we have previously understood to be a case of disparate treatment
because Elauf received the same treatment from Abercrombie as any other applicant who
appeared unable to comply with the company's Look Policy.").
109. Engy Abdelkader, Muslims Women, Religious Freedom, and EEOC v. Abercrombie,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PROJECT (June 5, 2015), https/www.religiousfreedominstitute.org/corners
tone/2016/7/14/muslims-women-religious-freedom-and-eoc-v-abercrombie.
110. David Masci, Europe Projected to Retain its Christian Majority, but Religious
Minorities Will Grow, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/04/15/europe-projected-to-retain-its-christian-majority-but-religious-minorities-
will-grow/.
111. See Abdelkader, supra note 109.
112. See id.
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collective action, develop strategies, and press claims." 113 In addition,
the growth of available financial resources has made it easier now for
religious adherents to spread their beliefs across cultural lines; this
process has involved "Christianity turning 'southern' and 'black,' Islam
turning 'Asian,' and Buddhism turning 'white' and 'western."'l1 4 Because
of globalization, different religions are less isolated from each other.
This has allowed some followers to fulfill the commands of their religion
by establishing a worldwide network of believers. 1 5 In so doing, people
of different backgrounds and from different parts of the world have a
sense of belonging in the religion with which they identify. Moreover, by
bringing different people into constant contact with one another,
globalization has perhaps fostered pluralism, in that "[elverybody talks
to everybody else" 16 and so on, increasing the rate at which people can
influence and understand each other. Finally, because of globalization,
religions once thought to be very different from one another are now
seen as sharing some desirable, worthwhile principles.
On the other hand, sometimes the exact opposite has been true.
Modern changes have forced diverse groups of people to compete with
each other in the global market, sometimes resulting in situations of the
in-and-out-group mentality, which encompasses the view that anyone
who does not belong to or is different from one's group must be "bad,
wrong, put down, converted, or killed."117 Typically, this mentality tends
to arise after a violent clash between cultures; hence the tendency in the
United States and elsewhere to associate Islam with terrorism and
Islamic hijab with radical fundamentalism after September 11.118 In
Europe, some legal changes have been the direct result of waves of
immigration. Globalization and the advent of modern transportation
have made it easier for people to cross borders. It was only after
Germany experienced an influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees
that Angela Merkel called for a ban on face veils.119 These occurrences
113. George M. Thomas, Religious Movements, World Civil Society, and Social Theory, 4
HEDGEHOG REV., Summer 2002, at 50, 61 (2002).
114. Daniel Golebiewski, Religion and Globalization New Possibilities, Furthering
Challenges, E-INr'L REL. (July 16, 2014), http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/16/religion-and-
globalization-new-possibilities-furthering-challenges/.
115. See, e.g., Matthew 28:19 ("Therefore go and make disciples of all nations ....
116. Peter Berger, Professor of Religion, Sociology, and Theology at Bos. Univ., Speech
in Key West, Florida (Dec. 4, 2006), http://www.pewforum.org/2006/12/04/religion-in-a-
globalizing-world2/.
117. Tribalism us. Globalization, BILL SAYS THIS (Sept. 21, 2001), https:/billsaysthis.com/tr
ibalism-vs-globalization/.
118. See Golebiewski, supra note 114.
119. Angela Merkel- Full-Face Veil Must Be Banned in Germany, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 7,
2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/angela-merkel-full-face-veil-banned-germany-161206
130507492.htnl
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in Europe have had their effects in the United States as well, as some
states have attempted or are attempting to significantly limit the
number of refugees who enter. 120 These negative consequences have
indubitably impacted religious freedom.
There are several reasons why Abercrombie is an appropriate case
for greater religious liberty around the world. First, Muslim women are
perhaps one of the largest groups currently experiencing widespread
religious discrimination. Second, Abercrombie involved a case about
veil-wearing, and veil-wearing is not peculiar to Islam. Roman Catholic
nuns and many Catholic churchgoers, for instance, wear veils to church
services. 121 In that sense, Abercrombie perhaps also allows for
Christians to wear religious necklaces or veils, or for Jews to wear
yarmulkes, in the workplace. Third, Abercrombie's stance on religious
freedom is modest, as it was an interpretation of Title VII, not of the
Constitution.1 22 Thus, it acknowledged that there still may be instances
where the government can lawfully ban the wearing of religious garbs
because of compelling circumstances, such as in courtrooms and during
police checks.
Reading the Abercrombie decision against the background of
globalization and the discrimination that Muslim women currently face,
it is worthwhile to ask what steps the international community can take
to protect not only Muslim women but also other religious minorities in
the workplace. Although there are a variety of sources for legal norms in
international law, this Note only seeks to briefly examine two of them:
the jus cogens theory of human rights and customary international law.
Part III explores whether either of these theories is a suitable vehicle
for regarding religious workplace accommodations as a fundamental
human right.
A. Jus Cogens as a Source of Human Rights Law
In English, jus cogens literally translates into "compeli.ng law." 123
Although the theory of jus cogens was known for a long time within
many legal systems, it found its modern manifestation in international
120. See, e.g., Maya Rhodan, Mike Pence Defends Refugee Plan Blocked by Judges, TIME
(Oct. 5, 2016), http://time.com/4518963/vice-presidential-debate-mike-pence-syrian-refugees/
(commenting on Indiana's attempt to block refugee immigration from countries where
terrorism has been an issue).
121. Abdo, supra note 78, at 450.
122. Though, as has been argued, what "religion" means under the First Amendment
probably affected what "religion" means under Title VII.
123. Kamrul Hossain, The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the U.N.
Charter, 3 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 72, 73 (2005).
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law when the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was opened for
signature on May 23, 1969.124 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention
defines jus cogens, also called peremptory norms, as a right that is
"accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted . ." 125 Thus, as
expressed in the Vienna Convention, a peremptory norm is a value-a
right-so fundamental to humanity that it must be observed by all for
the preservation of the international community. Because jus cogens is
effectively the supreme law in hierarchy, states that deviate from it are
therefore acting as hostes humani generis, or as "enemies of the human
race." 126
Generally, four criteria are considered in determining whether a
right is jus cogens:
1. whether the right is a norm of general international
law;
2. whether all states in the international community
must accept the right, which is determined by whether a
violation of the rule:
(a) shocks the conscience of the international
community, or
(b) threatens the survival of states;
3. whether any derogation from the right is permissible;
4. and whether the right can only be modified by a new
peremptory norm bearing the same character. 127
Currently, there are only a few practices that are prohibited because
of jus cogens theory. These include the practices of genocide, torture,
apartheid, and slavery.128
124. See LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 2 (1988).
125. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
126. Hostes humani generis, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
127. See, e.g., HANNIKAINEN, supra note 124, at 2; U.N. International Law Seminar,
Working Group No. 1, Criteria for Identifying Jus Cogens Norms in Public International
Law (July 24, 2015), http1/www.academia.edul4497941/CriteriaforjdentifyingjusCogens_nor
msin.publiclinternational_1aw.
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Although the freedom to practice religion is not currently considered
jus cogens, it is noteworthy that many of the most horrendous examples
of human rights violations in history were linked with religious
persecution and discrimination. The cases of genocide in Nazi Germany
and the Soviet Union can be partially explained by religious
intolerance. 129 Likewise, an estimated 1.5 million Christians were killed
in Armenia because of religious differences. 130 Because these violations
of jus cogens arose from religious disputes, there is arguably at least a
nexus between jus cogens observation and religion. Some scholars have
written extensively about this connection. 131
Several conceptual problems exist, however, with arguments
advocating for religious liberty to be considered jus cogens. Precisely
because jus cogens applies to all of humanity, peremptory norms are
uncodified and are, therefore, unspecific. Consequently, even if religious
liberty were to be considered supreme as a jus cogens right, it would still
be unclear as to what part of that right all countries would be required
to observe. Moreover, jus cogens is generally understood as detailing
prohibitions on government actions. In contrast, religious liberty often
entails accommodations for freedom of expression and for freedom of
worship. Finally, because all states in the international community
must agree as to what constitutes jus cogens, the basic premise for
incorporating religious liberty as jus cogens is absent, because it is
apparent that religious liberty carries different meanings in different
countries. As conceived, jus cogens offers little protection for freedom of
religious expression in the workplace.
But it is perhaps possible to rethink of jus cogens fundamentals
from a different perspective. Presumably, countries observe the general
prohibitions on genocide, torture, and slavery because those practices
are simply morally wrong. In contrast, countries like France believe
that it is morally permissible for the state to limit the freedom of
religion by barring Islamic hijab in the workplace. This view is widely
divergent from that prevailing in the United States, where many believe
that the practice of religion enhances morality. 132 This is so because the
128 See, M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga
Omnes, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996).
129. See Nathan A Adams, IV, A Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious
Liberty Beyond the Border, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 6 (2000).
130. Id. at 7.
131. See, e.g., id.
132. See, e.g., Ara Norenzayan, Does Religion Make People Moral?, 151 BEHAv. 365, 369
(2014), httpJ/www2.psych.ubc.ca/-ara/ManuscriptsNorenzayanBehaviour _DoesReligionMakePeo
pleMoralpdf ("American survey respondents who frequently pray and attend religious
services (regardless of religious denomination) reliably report more prosocial behavior,
such as more charitable donations and volunteerism.").
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freedom to practice one's religion peacefully is thought to lead to
personal fulfillment. Furthermore, many have taken the view that it is
immoral for the government to force someone to accept a particular faith
or to prevent people from believing what they will. Therefore, from an
ethical standpoint, there are arguments as to why the freedom of
religious expression should be respected. If, at some point, enough
countries adopted this interpretation of religious expression in the
workplace, then perhaps it could become jus cogens; this occurrence
would most likely result through social mobilization. Such a sudden
change in the near future, however, is unlikely.
B. International Customary Law as a Source of Human Rights Law
Besides the treaty, customary international law is the other primary
way in which international law comes about.133 Intuitively, as its name
suggests, the substance of customary international law derives from
countries' mere customs. In other words, countries obey customary
international law from a sense of legal obligation. Customary
international law has been described as a "unitary phenomenon that
pervades international relations."M Of course, state custom does not
arise instantaneously to protect a specific right; instead, a right's
meaning, understanding, and substance grows-or sometimes
contracts-over time. Therefore, the length of time it takes for a right to
become part of customary international law gives countries a chance to
dissent.
This brings up the persistent objector doctrine, which has been a
source of disagreement among human rights advocates. This doctrine
implicitly reflects how international law theories have changed from
focusing on natural law to focusing on the sovereignty and consent of
states. For a long time, "international law . . . was conceived of as
natural law, whereas today it is considered positive law developed
through, and grounding its authority in, state action and consent." 135
Therefore, there is a gloss to the persistent objector doctrine that relates
back to the jus cogens theory: Countries may opt to invoke the
persistent objector doctrine when the formation of a right is receiving
traction throughout the international community, but the doctrine is
simply inapplicable when the norm, in the rare instance, attains
133. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law,
66 U. Cm. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1999).
134. Id.
135. Note, The Charming Betsy Canon, Separation of Powers, and Customary
International Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1215, 1224 (2008).
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peremptory norm status.1 36 On such occasions, even if a state never
assented to such a norm and wanted to use the persistent objector
doctrine to commit a heinous act, the persistent doctrine would not
provide a valid defense. Moreover, if a state does not want to adhere to a
particular norm, it must, under the persistent objector doctrine, make
that known during the time of the right's formation; the state may not
object once the customary international norm has solidified.
With respect to religious liberty generally, the Third Restatement of
the Foreign Relations of the United States suggests that discrimination
on the basis of religion is a violation of customary international law.' 37
With respect to religious accommodation in the workplace specifically,
however, the issue is vaguer, because clearly there are countries that
outlaw some types of religious garbs; the view that this violates
customary international law has not widely been accepted.
In regard to custom, there are several instruments that tend to
show a respect for religion and religious practices. At the international
level, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) manifests
the freedoms of religion and of expression in Articles 18138 and 19,139
respectively. Although the UDHR is not binding and does not create any
obligations for states,1 40 it articulates many of the fundamental values
that are shared in the international community. These rights are also
contained in Articles 9141 and 10,142 respectively, of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Unlike the UDHR, however, the
ECHR puts limitation clauses on these rights, making them subject to
state regulation. At the domestic level, the Bill of Rights begins with the
136. See Holning Lau, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International
Human Rights Law, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 495, 495 (2005).
137. See RESTATEMENT (TIRED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §
702 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
138. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/217(III), art. 18 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] ("Everyone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.").
139. Id. art. 19 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.").
140. Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 2 NW. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 2, 4 (2004).
141. Eur. Conv. on H.R., art. 9 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.").
142. Id. art. 10 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.").
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First Amendment's Religion Clause and Free Speech Clauses, 143
memorializing the importance that the Framers attached to religious
liberty. Similarly, the constitutions of both France1 44 and Germany1 45
address free exercise and the freedom of conscience early in their
articles.
The freedoms outlined in these documents, it would seem, extend to
the manner in which people choose to dress because of religious reasons.
Because of the limitation clauses in documents such as the ECHR, the
issue then becomes whether a legitimate purpose exists to restrict
peaceful religious expression in the workplace. This question became
the core of Dahlab v. Switzerland,146 which has become one of the most
prominent and criticized European employment cases about religious
headscarves. The plaintiff, Lucia Dahlab, was a Swiss national who
taught at primary schools. 147 In 1991, Dahlab converted from
Catholicism to Islam.148 Dahlab believed that her faith mandated the
wearing of a headscarf,1 49 and soon after her conversion she began
wearing loose clothing that covered her entire body, except for her face.
This posed no problem until the Director General of Primary Education
heard about it and became involved. 150 After refusing requests to stop
wearing her hijab, Dahlab was brought to the Swiss courts, where she
lost, even though the courts assumed that her Islamic hijab came within
Article 9's provisions of the ECHR.
In dismissing Dahlab's claims, the courts reasoned that Dahlab, by
wearing a headscarf, may have interfered with the freedom of
conscience and religion of her pupils.15 But the problem with this
rationale is that none of Dahlab's pupils or their parents ever
complained about her headscarf between the time of her religious
conversion to Islam and the litigation-a span of about five years. 152 The
European Court of Human Rights (Court of Human Rights) went
further to say that the hijab "is hard to square with the principle of
gender equality. It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of
an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others
and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a
143. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
144. See 1958 CONS'r. I (Fr.).
145. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. IV, translation at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de.englisch-ggindex.html.
146. 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447 (2001).
147. See id. at 451.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 463.
152. Id. at 462-63.
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democratic society must convey to their pupils."153 Therefore, besides
the influence that religious garbs may have on impressionable children,
the Court of Human Rights also considered factors about gender
equality, intolerance, and democracy. This case is one of several 1 54 that
send the message that, although a person's internal beliefs are
protected, the manifestations of those beliefs may be regulated.
Contrary to the Court of Human Rights's belief that Dahlab's hijab
endangered gender equality, the hijab must carry different meanings in
different countries. 155 Although there are countries in which wearing
hijab in certain places is mandatory, such as Iran,1 5 Switzerland did
not force Dahlab to veil her face. As to the former countries, arguments
can be made that forcing women to dress a certain way by wearing hijab
is repressive and adverse to gender equality; these arguments, however,
do not seemingly apply in countries where women can wear hijab by-
choice. There are undoubtedly many Muslim immigrants across the
globe that wear hijab not only to practice their faith but also to
distinguish themselves from other groups. In this context, hijab can
become an emblem for one's identity, rather than a mark of oppression.
Thus, the Court of Human Rights failed to take the context of country
location into account. 157
In regard to the Court of Human Rights's other justifications, the
court assumed that Dablab's hijab symbolized her intolerance toward
non-Muslims. On the contrary, it is arguable that the peaceful practice
of religion fosters community. And, in point of fact, Dahlab "did not
denigrate the beliefs of others or promote the superiority of her own-
views . . . ."158 In regard to the court's point about democratic social
order, accommodating diverse religious practices, especially minority
ones, can help bolster social stability. One need only look at the United
States, where hijab has not yet been outlawed, to see that
accommodating it does not threaten the survival of a democracy. The
153. Id. at 463.
154. See, e.g., S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341 (2014) (litigation over
France's general ban on wearing the full-face veil in public); Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 173 (2005) (litigation over a Turkish law that banned Islamic hijab in
educational institutions).
155. See Sital Kalantry, Does a Ban on Wearing the Full Veil Promote Women's
Equality? An Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights Decision, INTLAwGRRLS
(July 9, 2014), httpsh/ilg2.org/2014/07/09/does-a-ban-on-wearing-the-full-veil-promote-womens-equ
ality-an-analysis-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-decision/.
156. Hijab by Country, PROJECT GUTENBERG SELF-PUBLISHING PRESS, http//gutenberg.us/
articles/hijabiby-muntry (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
157. See Kalantry, supra note 155.
158. Carolyn Evans, The "Islamic Scarf" in the European Court of Human Rights, 7
MIELB. J. INT'L L. 52, 69 (2006).
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First Amendment recognizes that legal "tolerance [of religious practices]
works better than suppression in maintaining the democratic order."15 9
Thus, the court's grounds for there being legitimate interests to
circumscribe religious expression under Article 9 of the ECHR in the
workplace seem suspect and, indeed, unsatisfactory.
The foregoing arguments apply with equal vigor to the workplace
restrictions in France and the proposed restrictions in Germany. But
there are still more arguments. Besides altruism, government power
stands as a practical reason to let people religiously express themselves
in the workplace. Letting government get too deep into religious affairs
is, in effect, giving it that much more authority; in a society of free
people, government power must be limited indeed. Much like Henry's
proposed Assessment Bill in the early colonies, a modern government's
attempt to prohibit some forms of religious expression is a dangerous
abuse of power, and a prohibition on religious garbs like hijab in the
workplace seems to violate Locke's vision of the purity of institutional
religion. Lastly, it is a fact of life that people will pursue different paths.
Just because paths may conflict, however, does not mean that they are
not valuable. In fact, the value derived is that people get to choose their
own paths by acting as independent, rationale agents.16 The Supreme
Court's interpretation of Title VII in Abercrombie appreciates this truth,
and it is time that other courts around the world do the same.
CONCLUSION
Part I illustrated how globalization played a small, but important,
role in the Framers' early formulations of religious liberty; the Framers'
understandings were shaped partially by the flow of ideas, which made
the writings of European Enlightenment figures accessible. Part II
delved deeper into the Supreme Court's Title VII interpretation in
Abercrombie, and explored why hijab is a significant symbol in Islam.
Part III sought to reassess international human rights law to consider
whether the Supreme Court's understanding of religious liberty, as
elucidated in Part I, can be applied so as to allow for the accommodation
of Islamic hijab in foreign workplaces. Jus cogens is one possible route,
but it would take a complete reformulation of jus cogens theory to
incorporate religious accommodations as a fundamental human right.
Customary international law is another possibility, but other courts
claim that there are legitimate state interests that justify the preclusion
159. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8 (4th ed. 2014).
160. Cumper & Lewis, supra note 23, at 614.
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of religious expression in the workplace. Part III sought to undermine
those claims.
A lack of respect for different beliefs, especially minority religious
beliefs, is becoming increasingly common in today's world. In the
context of both the United States and abroad, this Note has strived to
promote more respect for differing religious viewpoints. For a teacher, it
is easy to view the hijab as a mere distraction in the classroom-and in
some instances, it might really be a distraction. For a bystander on the
street, it is similarly easy to think of a passerby's wearing of hijab as a
strange practice-and to some degree, this is an inescapable
consequence, as some people will always find something strange in
others' behaviors. Toleration and understanding, however, are essential
to a healthy, diverse society. Currently, hijab is seen as a taboo-as a
symbol of gender inequality and of Islamic fundamentalism and
radicalism. But this conception is only superficial and merely scratches
the surface of a much larger issue. Someday, maybe people will look
beyond the veil and realize that those who hold different religious
beliefs are still worthy of legal protection.
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